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“OFFICIAL” BONDHOLDER: A NEW 
HOLDOUT CREATURE IN SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING AFTER VULTURE FUNDS? 
For years, holdout litigations have posed a threat to the successful 
restructuring of sovereign bonds. Among these holdout creditors, the 
vulture funds have been particularly deft in manipulating the system. To 
prevent holdout litigation, sovereign debtors and creditors use various 
contractual devices—some of which have proven to be successful. During 
the recent Ukraine-Russia sovereign bond dispute, a new type of holdout 
creditor immerged—one that is potentially immune from these contractual 
arrangements. This note will begin by presenting an overview of the 
process of sovereign debt restructuring.  It will then explore the problem 
of holdout litigation in bond restructuring and the solutions currently 
available. Finally, the dispute between Ukraine and Russia will be 
examined as it has brought a new dimension to this already complicated 
problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
?
Typically, when a creditor and debtor sign a loan agreement, the 
creditor delivers the proceeds to the debtor and is repaid the debt over a 
number of subsequent months or years.1 A default takes place when the 
debtor fails to meet its obligations under the agreement.2 Such default 
usually triggers an acceleration clause in the debt agreement; this clause 
allows a creditor to accelerate the entire debt and collect any amounts 
outstanding. 3  Sovereign debt is the debt issued or guaranteed by the 
government of a sovereign state.4 When a debtor country defaults on the 
debt, 5  it will seek a “restructuring” of the debt. This restructuring is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1.  ALEXIS RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY
11 (2003).
2.  Id. The main event of default is missing a scheduled payment of principal or interest. Id.
3.  Id.
4.  Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf.  
5.  In the context of sovereign debt, a default occurs when the government fails to make the 
payment on due time. Id. at 8. The default can be a result of a liquidity problem; when a government 
generates insufficient revenue to meet the scheduled payment of interest or principal. RIEFFEL, supra
note 1, at 14. Alternatively, the government may face a solvency problem when it incurs an 
unsustainable amount of debt so that some reduction of the principal or the interest payment is 
warranted to restore its creditworthiness. Id.
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conducted though a legal process and involves “an exchange of 
outstanding debt instruments . . . for new debt instruments or cash.”6
A sovereign debtor is different from a private debtor for several 
reasons. Most notably, the possibility of liquidation 7  is “out of 
consideration” for a national sovereign.8 The sovereign debtors are also 
regarded as “too big to fail,”9 since a default on sovereign debt could 
trigger an economic domino effect—such as a currency collapse, bank 
runs, trade disruptions, and macroeconomic contraction.10 Concerns over 
these spillovers have facilitated a belief that sovereign countries must be 
bailed out by public funds.11 This expectation of official bailout in turn 
causes a moral hazard as it creates an incentive for the sovereign debtors 
to adopt a less prudent economic course.12
While the value of domestic debt is inherently built upon the 
“framework of laws and institutions that support them,” 13  creditors of 
sovereign debt enjoy less protection as their enforcement mechanisms are 
limited.14  First, as a practical matter, few sovereign assets are located in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6.  Das et al., supra note 4. Debt restructuring can be in the form of a debt rescheduling (a 
lengthening of maturities of the old debt), a debt reduction (reducing the face value of the old 
instruments), a debt buyback (an exchange of debt into cash at a discount), a debt refinancing (the 
conversion of the old debt including arrears into a new instrument), or a conversion (the exchange of 
debt for a non-debt liability, such as equity). Id.; see also RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 23. Of course, it is 
not necessary for debt restructuring to occur after a default. In some instances, the debtor countries 
will seek a debt exchange that occurs prior to the default. The purpose of such “preemptive debt 
restructuring” is to prevent the otherwise inevitable defaults. See Das et al., supra note 4, at 8.
7.  Liquidation can be defined as “[t]he act or process of converting assets into cash, esp. to 
settle debts.” Liquidation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8.  Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort? COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC COMMONS 8 (1995), http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:8279. It is also rare, if 
not impossible, for municipalities and other sub-sovereign entities. On the other hand, private debtors 
can be liquidated under bankruptcy law in the states. A good example is Chapter 7 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 7.
9.  Anna Gelpern, Commentary, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 1095, 1113-14 (2013). 
10.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 66.
11.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Facing the Debt Challenge of Countries That Are “Too Big To Fail,”
in SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT 2 (Robert W. Kolb, ed. 2011). The word “bailout” is 
normally used to describe “financing provided by official agencies to defaulting countries as a 
misappropriation of scarce taxpayer resources for the benefit of private sector creditors.” See Rieffel, 
supra note 1, at 53.
12.  Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 2. The word “moral hazard” is often referred to a situation 
where the insurance may “reduce incentives for prudent behavior by lowering expected losses.” 
NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 74 (2004). In the sovereign debt context, moral hazard describes a situation in 
which a sovereign borrower, relying on official lenders (such as IMF) as a last resort, “take[s] out a 
loan that it has no intention of repaying." Id. This is in stark contrast with private debtors who usually 
enjoy no such “insurance” by official sectors. The exceptions are commercial banks, which are also 
regarded as “too big to fail” because of the potential economic spillovers they may cause in the event 
of default. See Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 2. 
13.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 11. 
14.  Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of 
Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 651, 653 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss3/10
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foreign jurisdictions creditors are able to reach. 15  Second, sovereign 
debtors have various special formal defenses available to them to avoid 
repayment. The sovereign could assert sovereign immunity from suit and 
execution.16 It could also resort to the principle of international comity, 
which recognizes that one country may, “out of international duty and 
convenience,” voluntarily enforce the laws of another country.17 Another 
legal defense is the act of state doctrine. 18  Unlike the comity defense 
which limits the court’s jurisdiction, the act of state doctrine allows the 
court to determine whether judicial interference runs the risk of 
embarrassing the executive branch.19
Finally, a special defense may arise when the debtor state inherits a 
debt incurred by the predecessor government. In that case, the debtor 
could use the “odious debt” argument to repudiate the agreement.20 Two 
types of odious debt have been recognized by the international 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15.  Id. Thus, even if a creditor successfully obtains judgment against the debtor in its own 
jurisdiction, it is questionable whether the debtor country will honor the judgment by handing over the 
assets located within its borders. Id.
16.  Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution Of Modern Sovereign Debt 
Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, And Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 47, 
48 (2010). However, many jurisdictions have carved out numerous exceptions to foreign state’s 
immunity. Id. For example, the United States enacted Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 
1976, which allows a private party to sue a foreign government in U.S. courts if the complaint relates 
to commercial activity. See Panizza et al., supra note 14, at 653. As a result, it is no longer an absolute 
shield for sovereign debtors. Id. at 654.
17.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895). In English courts and civil-law courts, the 
doctrine is limited to the questions of sovereignty or public international law, such as diplomatic 
immunity. See Joe R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 44 (1991). In United 
States, the doctrine is broader: international comity precludes the court’s jurisdiction over the lawsuits 
if  the “debtor’s actions could be viewed broadly justified in light of U.S. policies on how international 
debt crisis ought to be resolved.” See Panizza et al., supra note 14, at 654-55. 
18.  Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran. Note, Declawing the Vulture Funds: 
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 255 (2003). 
19.  Id. Specifically, courts would refrain from scrutiny of the foreign act when a judgment 
against a foreign government might complicate foreign relations, a territory in which the executive 
branch is conceived to have sole power. See Paul, supra note 17, at 67. Unfortunately, because 
sovereign default in international jurisdiction is not considered to be an act of state, the defense is 
equally toothless in sovereign debt litigation. Id. 
20.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 52. In general, public international law requires a successor state 
to inherit the debts of their predecessors. This norm is sometimes called the “doctrine of state 
succession.” Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts,
56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1202 (2007). The odious debt argument attempts to qualify the rule. It goes as 
such: when the debt was incurred for “odious” purposes, the successor state is not expected to honor 
the obligations associated with that debt. See RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 52. In a classic formulation by 
Alexander Sack in 1927, the sovereign debt is presumptively odious when “the debt is contracted by a 
despotic power, for a purpose that is not in the general interests or needs of the state, and the lender 
knows that the proceeds of the debt will not benefit the nation as a whole.” Buchheit et al., supra, at 
1218 (citing ALEXANDER N. SACK, “LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS
DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES” [THE EFFECTS OF STATE
TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157 (1927).
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community: war debts and hostile debts.21 A third type of odious debt—
which emerged in the early twentieth century—is broader.22 This type of 
debt is called “regime debt”23 and is incurred by a lender for illegitimate 
purposes and often treated as a personal loan.24 This debt is usually only 
repaid out of state funds if the ruler remains in power.25 An example of 
regime debt is the debt incurred during President Tinoco’s reign of Costa 
Rica.26 The doctrine is also used in World Duty Free v. Kenya, a famous 
arbitration that occurred in 2006.27  In that case, the tribunal ruled the 
contractual obligation was incurred because of a bribe and was void for 
international public policy reasons.28 Though the defenses of war debt and 
hostile debt have been generally accepted, the regime debt argument 
remains controversial.29
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21.  See Buchheit et al., supra note 20, at 1228 n. 85 (finding that the war debt and the hostile 
debt have probably been recognized as formal exceptions to the state succession rule).“War debt” is 
raised by a government “to finance the conduct of hostilities against a force, foreign or domestic, that 
eventually succeeds in overthrowing the contracting government.” Id. at 1212. The “hostile debt” is 
incurred “to fund conquest, colonization, war, or suppressing secessionist attempts.” Andrew Yianni & 
David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 749, 757 (2006). Scholars also use “subjugation debt” to convey essentially the same meaning. 
Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 605, 630 
(2006). A classic example is the Cuban debt. Before the Spanish war, the Spanish government raised 
debt to be serviced and repaid from Cuban revenues. Buchheit et al., supra note 20, at 1214.  
Following the Spanish-American war of 1898, Spain ceded Cuban to United States. Id. The U.S. 
government refused to assume the Cuban debt, arguing that the loans were not made for the benefit of 
Cuban or consented by Cuban people. Id. at 1214-15. It also argued that the creditors, knowing that the 
debt was incurred to suppress people fighting for independence from Spanish rule, assumed the risk 
that the debt would not be repaid by the rebels. Id.
22.  Buchheit et al., supra note 20, at 1216. 
23.  King, supra note 21, at 630.
24.  Buchheit et al., supra note 20, at 1216. 
25.  Id.
26.  Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 21, at 762. Before the Tinoco government fell in 1919, it 
managed to borrow money from the Royal Bank of Canada. Buchheit et al., supra note 20, at 1216. In 
a subsequent arbitration between Costa Rica and Great Britain, then Chief Justice William Taft, sitting 
as the sole arbitrator, found Costa Rica was not required to assume the debt obligation. Id. Taft 
reasoned the bank failed to prove the money loaned to the Tinoco government was for legitimate use 
rather than for Tinoco’s personal support after he took over the country. Id. at 1217.  Taft also 
explicitly stated the invalidation of the loan obligation had nothing to do with the legitimacy of the 
Tinoco government. Id. Thus, Taft rejected the argument as inconsistent with the doctrine of state 
succession. Id.
27.  World Free Duty Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 Award, 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf. The arbitration was brought before the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID.
28.  Id. ¶156. The dispute arose out of a contract signed between World Duty Free (WDF) and 
the Kenyan government in 1989 which WDF claimed Kenya had breached. Id. ¶74. The Republic of 
Kenya responded, among other things, that the contract was unenforceable because it was procured by 
paying a bribe of $2 million to the then President of Kenya, which is criminal conduct according to 
Kenyan law. Id. ¶105. Upon examination of the evidence, the tribunal concluded the payments must be 
regarded as a bribe and the contract was void. Id. ¶156. The tribunal also noted that bribery is 
traditionally abhorred in common law and is more “odious than theft.” Id. ¶173. Because the case is 
decided in the specific context of bribery, some scholars insist that a fourth category of odious debt be 
carved out to include debt procured through corruption. King, supra note 21, at 652. 
29.  Indeed, scholars have found that, unlike war debts and hostile debts, regime debt is not a 
customary rule of international law. See Yianni & Tinkler, supra note 21, at 766-68; see also Anna 
?
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A.? The International Regime for Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring
A typical restructuring process starts with the sovereign debtor 
initiating a “negotiation or preparation phase.” 30  The debtor country, 
assisted by the staff of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter 
“IMF”), will verify the total debt claims; this includes all loans, bonds and 
other debt instruments. They will then conduct a “detailed debt 
sustainability analysis.” 31  The goal of the country is to secure an 
“economic reform and interim financing program” from the IMF.32
The interim financing program, however, is only temporary. The 
debtor will then negotiate with its creditors for a long-term restructuring 
plan. 33  Among the various creditors, the debts owed to international 
financial institutions—such as the IMF, World Bank, and other 
multilateral development banks—are respected by the debtor.34 Their de 
facto priority is generally accepted because the sovereign desires to 
“maintain its future access to emergency financing and a good working 
relationship with other governments”; for the IMF in particular, financing 
to the debtor country is tied to the country’s policy changes.35
The debts owed to the national governments or bilateral lending 
agencies will be restructured under the Paris Club framework.36 The Paris 
Club is an “informal group of creditors and ad hoc negotiation forum, 
consisting of the governments of “nineteen of the largest world economies 
plus additional creditor governments on a case by case basis.” 37  The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005) (“As it 
happens, no national or international tribunal has ever cited Odious Debt as grounds for invalidating a 
sovereign obligation.”); but see King, supra note 21, at 648 (arguing that the failure of the courts to 
recognize the doctrine is not surprising because litigating against sovereign states in domestic courts 
becomes possible only after the erosion of sovereign immunity and is thus a relatively recent 
phenomenon.) The U.S. courts have never officially adopted this doctrine in any published opinion.
See Mortimer Off Shore Services, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 615 F.3d 97, 109 (2d. Cir. 
2010) (the court declined to reach the issue of successor state liability because the plaintiff failed to 
plead jurisdiction based upon a commercial activity under FSIA, although the Court, as evidenced in 
n.12, is fully aware of the academic debate about the odious debt doctrine). See also Morris v. 
People’s Republic of China, 478 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) and Jackson v. People’s Republic of 
China, 794 F.2d 1490 (8th Cir. 1986). In both cases, P.R.C. alleged the bonds issued by its predecessor 
governments were odious debts and thus P.R.C. bore no responsibility for such bonds. The courts ruled 
in favor of P.R.C. but never specifically addressed the odious debt argument.   
30.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 12 (internal citations omitted). This preparation phase can take 
months or even years. Id.
31.  Id.
32.  Gelpern, supra note 9, at 1105. 
33.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 12.
34.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 252-53.
35.  Id.
36.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 35. 
37.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 14.
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government creditors will agree to grant relief according to their preset 
reduction formulas and obtain the debtor’s “commitment to get 
‘comparability of treatment’ from other public and private creditors.”38
Commercial banks loans are restructured via the London Club—a “term 
that loosely describes the case-by-case restructuring routine developed 
between Western banks and developing countries in the late 1970s.”39 In 
the London Club process, the debtor country will negotiate with the Bank 
Advisory Committee acting as the representatives of the creditor banks.40
This process is preferred because commercial banks usually use a 
“syndicated loan”41 to spread risk among themselves.42
The last category of sovereign debt creditors is private creditors other 
than commercial banks, which typically consists of bondholders.43 There 
is “a general impression that bonds are senior to bank loans”; one reason is 
that the investors expect the borrowing country to restructure its bank 
loans first before it seeks recourse in bond restructuring. 44  Sovereign 
bonds are in general restructured with “exchange offers.” 45  After it 
negotiates with each of these categories of creditors, the debtor country 
will present the restructuring offer to all creditors.46 A successful exchange 
usually requires a “certain minimum threshold of acceptance by creditors” 
within each category.47 Once the offer is accepted, the restructuring is 
completed.48
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
38.  Gelpern, supra note 9, at 1105. “Comparability of treatment” means that the debtor 
country “seek[s]from non-multilateral creditors, in particular other official bilateral creditor countries 
that are not members of the Paris Club and private creditors (mainly banks, bondholders and 
suppliers), a treatment on comparable terms to those granted in the Agreed Minutes.” See Club de 
Paris, What Does Comparability of Treatment Mean?, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications 
/page/what-does-comparability-of-treatment-mean (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (explaining how the 
“comparability of treatment” test works). In reality, obtaining comparability of treatment test can be 
difficult for various reasons, including the difficulty in determining comparability, the predictability of 
the restructuring terms, and the need to minimize budgetary costs which results in an institutional 
preference for the equivalent of the par option and low interest rates. See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra
note 12, at 258-59. Scholars have found that the Paris Club debt could be treated effectively as junior 
debt by the debtor country since the government creditors rarely litigate to recover payment. Id. at 259. 
39.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 16.
40.  Id.
41.  
A syndicated loan is made to a single borrower by two or more direct lending 
institutions, on similar terms and conditions, using common documentation 
and administered by a common agent bank or separate agent banks. Common 
documentation and direct lending are the crucial elements that hold the 
syndicate of lending banks together. 
Joseph J. Norton, International Syndicated Lending: The Legal Context for Economic 
Development in Latin America, 2-SUM NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 21, 24 (1996).
42.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 36. 
43.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 251. 
44.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 37. 
45.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 14. 
46.  Id. at 13.
47.  Id.
48.  Id. Of course, completion of the restructuring process does not mean that the exchange 
would guarantee debt sustainability in the future. 
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B.? Sovereign Bonds: The Hotbed of Sovereign Debt Disputes 
?
i.? The Rise of Tradable Bonds in Credit Markets  
?
In the 1980s, most of the sovereign debts were syndicated bank 
loans.49 The London Club process was “heavily used” during this period 
when countries in the developing region defaulted on their debt.50 Intra-
creditor disputes were a major problem for bank debt, causing delays in 
implementing the deal.51  In contrast with bank loans, sovereign bonds 
were in small scale and considerable defaults did not take place.52 These 
bonds “escaped restructuring during the workouts” in the 1980s.53
A major policy change occurred in the late 1980s when the U.S. 
Treasury announced the Brady Plan, which allowed the countries in 
default to convert their bank loans into sovereign bonds.54 Such “exchange 
of commercial bank loans for tradable bonds” created a “sustainable 
secondary market for developing country bonds at the beginning of the 
1990s.” 55  While banks became more “cautious about lending to the 
governments” after the bank crisis in 1980s and the write-offs associated 
with the debt exchange in 1990s, bond financing became the “dominant 
form of private lending.”56 As a result, the emerging markets witnessed “a 
new wave of capital inflows” 57
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
49.  Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 299, 309 (2005).
50. RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 130.
51.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 17.
52.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 192. 
53.  Id.
54.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 18. A bond is defined as “[a] written promise to pay money or 
do some act if certain circumstances occur or a certain time elapses.” Bond, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A “bond indenture” is a “contract between a bond issuer and a 
bondholder outlining a bond's face value, interest rate, maturity date, and other features.” Bond
Indenture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Compared to bank loans, bonds tend to mature 
in more than five years. RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 37. This is because “bonds typically get repaid in a 
single bullet payment when they mature,” rather than amortize. Id. at 38.
55.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 37. “Bonds are underwritten by investment banks and priced to 
sell immediately at issue to institutional and individual investors, thereby transferring all the default 
risk.” Id. “They are designed to be resold easily in secondary markets.” Id. at 38. The secondary 
market for bonds performs an important signaling function. “Virtually every emerging market bond 
issue is traded every day, thereby establishing a yield curve for any sovereign borrower that has floated 
a number of issues.” Id. at 40.
56.  Id. at 36. 
57.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 14. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
a Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 960 (2000) (“States have shifted 
their borrowing source from banks to bond investors in the lower cost capital markets.”); Anna 
Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the Next Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83,
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 151 (2008) (noticing that scholars have discussed the use of bonds 
?
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The shift from bank loans to tradable bonds in the lending market has 
caused the atomization of the creditor community and the dispersed debt 
situation.58 The sovereign bonds are owned by bondholders with widely 
differing institutional characteristics.59 Moreover, creditors can purchase 
sovereign bonds in the market at different prices.60 Those who pay a price 
close to the face value of the bonds prefer restructuring plans which 
preserves the face value of the bonds, while those who purchase at a steep 
discount are more willing to accept a facial reduction. 61  As a result, 
coordination among bondholders becomes an issue in sovereign bond 
restructuring.62
ii.? Holdout Litigation and Vulture Funds 
?
Like bank loans, sovereign bonds can be restructured through a 
voluntary exchange offer.63 This means the dissenting bondholders could 
opt out and sue the sovereign debtor in courts to obtain full payments.64
These holdout litigations pose a classic case of free riding, impairing the 
economic welfare of all creditors by discouraging participation, and 
delaying the reaching of an agreement.65 The practice of holdout litigation 
has increased significantly since the 1990s.66 Holdout litigation is a risky 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
denominated in foreign currency and governed by foreign law, “but have yet to engage with the rise of 
domestic bonds and credit derivatives”). 
58.  Hagan, supra note 49, at 310.
59.  Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1070 (2004) Bondholders may include “large 
commercial banks, smaller commercial banks, local banks, investment banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, mutual funds, retail funds, hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.” 
Id.
60.  Id. at 1072. 
61.  Id.
62.  Hagan, supra note 49, at 310. 
63.  See Das et al., supra note 4, at 21. Note that an exchange offer is not necessarily voluntary 
in nature. For example, bond restructurings in early twenty-first century—such as those in Pakistan, 
Ukraine, and Ecuador—were largely non-consensual; the sovereigns unilaterally changed the terms of 
the old bonds as part of a comprehensive restructuring plan. RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 211-213. See
also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 59, at 1070 (“While all of these restructurings involved exchange 
offers, Pakistan and Uruguay relied on ad hoc consultations with bondholders to apprise them of the 
terms of the offer and to encourage them to accept the offer, the Ukraine engaged in an extensive effort 
to contact bondholders, and Ecuador essentially declined to speak with bondholders.”) Such “forced” 
exchange, while avoiding bondholder coordination problems altogether, hardly satisfied bondholders, 
and to some extent precipitated holdout litigations. See RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 263 (Bondholders 
might find that the restructuring was not necessary, or the countries were “pursuing weak reform 
programs,” or the process was unfair due to lack of negotiation and “mutually agreeable terms.”) 
64.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 297. However, because the sovereign’s assets are 
usually beyond their reach, the bondholders generally ask the courts to halt payments on the new debt 
arising out of the restructuring plan. Id.
65.  Id.
66.  Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court
3-7 (May 6, 2014) (working paper on file with the authors), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997. The study reveals that the likelihood that 
?
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strategy because of the potential sovereign immunity defenses67 and the 
limits on recovery discussed above.68 In addition, because this litigation is 
costly, the holdout creditors must give up liquidity and spend time and 
money in litigation.69 Nevertheless, the cost may be overshadowed by the 
huge profits from a full recovery. Some creditors, known as “vulture 
creditors,” purchase sovereign bonds off the secondary debt market at 
substantial discounts and then sue debtor countries for the full 
repayment.70
Vulture funds are regarded as “particularly pernicious” types of 
holdout creditors for several reasons, the first being that vulture funds seek 
an immediate return in the investment.71 Their natural propensity for quick 
returns enables them to aggressively litigate in court.72 Second, vulture 
funds are not subject to “peer or regulatory pressure.”73 They can easily 
dissolve and reconstitute themselves under a new identity.74 Finally, as 
vulture funds march into the secondary market and purchase bonds from 
impoverished countries, their litigations exacerbate those countries’ 
financial situations, limiting the countries’ opportunities to develop their 
economies in the long term.75
iii.? Successful Holdout Litigations and Arbitration 
?
Elliott Associates (hereinafter “Elliot”) is “one of the most well-
known vulture funds” in holdout litigations. 76  In May 1996, Elliot 
purchased Peruvian sovereign debt on the secondary market, and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has increased from less than 10% in the 1980s to 
more than 40% in recent years. Id. at 10-11.
67.  Anna Gelpern, supra note 9, at 1102. 
68.  Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 YALE
J. REG. 189, 194-95 (2014). The authors found that sovereign immunity shields military, diplomatic, 
and central bank assets abroad. Id.
69.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 300.
70.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 50.
71.  Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 262.
72.  Id. at 262. Vulture funds have filed nearly 75% of all sovereign debt cases since 2000. 
Compared to other types of creditors, “vulture” funds sue for longer periods of time, initiate more 
attachment attempts, and litigate for much larger amounts. See Schumacher et al., supra note 66, at 2. 
In contrast with vulture funds, banks and other institutional investors have interest in maintaining long-
term relationships with sovereign debtors. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 59, at 1073-74. 
73. Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 262.
74.  Id. at 263.
75.  See Id.
76.  Robert Auray, In Bonds We Trustee: A New Contractual Mechanism to Improve Sovereign 
Bond Restructurings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 889, 914 (2013).
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subsequently refused to participate in Peru’s Brady Plan, instead 
requesting repayment from Peru.77 When Peru refused to pay the full value 
of the debt, Elliot initiated an action in New York and obtained a favorable 
judgment.78 Peru then sought to use the Euroclear Bank in Brussels to 
make the payments. 79  The Court of Appeals of Brussels issued an 
injunction in favor of Elliott.80 In its resolution, the Brussels Court relied 
on the Pari Passu clause in the debt contract, finding that “debt should be 
paid down equally towards all creditors in proportion to their claim.”81
Elliott recently secured another victory over Argentina. In 2001, 
Argentina defaulted on its debt securities under a fiscal agency 
agreement.82 The agreement contains Pari Passu provisions that purport to 
protect purchasers of the bonds from subordination.83 Argentina undertook 
two debt exchanges in 2005 and 2010.84 In the meantime, Argentina also 
passed  “the Lock Law” which  prohibited the state from “conducting any 
type of in-court, out-of-court, or private settlement with respect to the 
bonds.”85  In 2011, a group of holdout creditors filed a lawsuit against 
Argentina, asking the U.S. District Court to grant specific performance 
under the Pari Passu Clause.86 The District Court found in favor of the 
creditors and invalidated the Lock Law.87 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision and found that Argentina violated the 
Pari Passu clause by failing to make payments to the plaintiffs while 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
77.  Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1999).
78.  Elliott initiated the action in district court, seeking a prejudgment attachment to U.S. 
Treasury Bonds as the collateral for the Brady Bonds. Id., at 368.  The District Court dismissed the 
complaint because Elliott purchased the Peruvian debt with the intent and purpose to sue, thus 
violating Section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law. Id. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
Section 489 is not violated because Elliot’s primary goal is to satisfy a valid debt. Id. at 372. The 
district court heard the case on remand and entered judgments in favor of Elliott. Elliott Assocs., L.P. 
v. Banco De La Nacion, No. 96 CIV. 7916 RWS, 2000 WL 1449862 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000). The 
attachment and restraint orders prevented the fiscal agent under Peru’s Brady Plan from making 
payments to bondholders; consequently, Peru was unable to make an $80 million coupon payment on 
its newly restructured Brady debt, triggering a thirty-day grace period prior to formal default. Wheeler 
& Attaran, supra note 18, at 257. 
79.  Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 257.
80.  Specifically, Elliot filed an ex parte motion to the President of the Brussels Commercial 
Court seeking to enjoin payments to Peru’s Brady bondholders. Id.
81.  Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: 
Development in Recent Litigation 124 (University of London, BIS Paper No. 72u, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473988. As a result of the injunction, Peru settled 
with Elliot and paid off the debt in the total amount of $58.45 million. Id. It represented a nearly 500% 
return on Elliot’s initial investment. Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 258. 
82.  NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012).  
83.  Id. at 251. The Pari Passu clauses require that the debtor treat the bonds “at least equally 
with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.” Id. 
84.  Id. at 250. 
85.  Id. at 252. 
86. IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring at 8, Staff Report (Oct. 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ 
ppindex.aspx.
87.  Id.
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satisfying obligations to holders of new exchange bonds, and by enacting 
the Lock Law.88
The Argentina debt dispute also precipitated arbitration before the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).89 In 
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, a group of creditors challenged Argentina’s 
defaults on the sovereign bonds based on the Argentina-Italy Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT). 90  After resolving the jurisdiction issue, 91  the 
tribunal held that when countries act unilaterally as sovereigns to 
restructure debt in a way that allegedly violates BIT provisions, this gives 
rise to a treaty claim, which is independent of any contract claim. 92
Abaclat opens a door for creditors to assert a treaty-based claim in 
arbitration forum.93
iv.? Legal Solutions to SovereignBond Restructuring
?
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
88.  NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 260. The order approved by the district court prohibits 
Argentina from making payment on restructured bonds without paying the plaintiffs in full. Id.
89. See Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes,
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 344 (2006). The ICSID is a neutral tribunal established by the World 
Bank in the 1960s to resolve disputes among sovereign states. Id. Its jurisdiction is limited to “any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between the Contracting State (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national 
from another Contracting State.” See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
90.  Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 ¶8 (Aug. 4, 2011). “BITs are bilateral treaties between two governments 
created with the goal of mutually protecting private foreign investment.” See Christian Hofmann, A
Legal Analysis of the Euro Zone Crisis, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 519, 556 (2013).
91.  In response to Argentina’s challenge of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the ICSID first found 
that sovereign debt constituted an investment for purposes of BIT. See ICSID Case No ARB/07/5 ¶ 
707(Aug. 4, 2011). The tribunal then allowed the aggregation of tens of thousands of individual claims 
into a single “mass claim,” despite lacking any precedent and admitting that this consolidation would 
necessarily lead to decreased procedural rights for individual claimants. Id. at ¶¶ 294-96. 
92.  Id. ¶¶ 311-326.
93.  Compared to litigation, arbitration is still “relatively unusual.” See Cross, supra note 89, at 
336 (finding that sovereign debt agreements typically provide that the borrower will submit to the 
jurisdiction of New York or London courts, but not in any arbitration forum); cf. W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 335, 335 (Fall 2010) (tracing the use of arbitration clauses in the early 
twentieth century sovereign debt contracts). Indeed, the arbitration between Argentina and Italian 
bondholders is based on the arbitration clause in the BIT, not in the bond agreement. To rely on the 
BIT, the bondholders may argue that non-payments of the bonds constitute expropriation for which 
they are entitled to compensation. See Hofmann, supra note 90, at 68; They can also rely on the non-
discrimination clauses which purportedly ensure equality among the investors. See Ellie Norton, 
International Investment Arbitration and the European Debt Crisis, 13 CHI. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (2012). 
For foreign investors, BITs generally designate a specific international arbitration forum, usually the 
ICSID, as the means for settling disputes. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs 
Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 67, 71 (2005). 
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In light of the collective action problem94 and its adverse effects on 
economic recovery of the debtor country,95 the international community 
pursues two distinct approaches to solve the problem: the contractual 
approach and the statutory approach.96
a)? Contractual Devices – The Perceived Panacea
?
Debtor countries can reduce holdout litigation by including clauses 
that generate incentives for participation.97 A common type of clause is the 
exit consent clause, which “enable[s] a majority of bondholders 
participating in an exchange offer to alter important nonpayment terms of 
the old bonds in such a way as to reduce their value, thus encouraging 
participation in the exchange.”98
Another useful contractual device is the collective action clause 
(CAC). Unlike exit consent clauses, CACs address the relationship among 
the creditors in bond renegotiation.99 When sovereign states issue bonds to 
the markets, these bonds are usually governed by the laws of “a financial 
center such as New York, London, or Tokyo.”100 Bonds issued under New 
York law and English law are by far the most popular ones.101 By custom, 
New York law bonds require unanimous consent of bondholders to change 
the terms of payment and make new binding terms.102 In contrast, bonds 
issued under English law contain clauses allowing a majority of the 
holders to make changes that are binding on minority holders.103 Since 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
94.  In other words, if the perceived holdout risk is significant, creditors who would otherwise 
have agreed to participate in a restructuring may be unwilling to do so. See supra notes 64-65 and 
accompanying text.
95.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining how holdout litigation may impede 
economic development in impoverished countries). 
96. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 308. 
97.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 22. 
98.  Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 265. Most bonds contain provisions that ensure their 
legal enforcement, including waiver of sovereign immunity and cross-default provisions. Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 139-140 (2012). Cross-default provisions provide that if the sovereign defaults 
on some of its debt, that action constitutes a default on other debt even though the sovereign is current 
on that debt. Id. at 140. These clauses thus can be used to prevent opportunistic defaults on the part of 
the debtor countries. Exit-consent clauses, therefore, would allow a simple majority of bondholders to 
remove these litigation-friendly clauses, leaving a bond with unattractive legal features and a low 
secondary market value. See Das et al., supra note 4, at 46; cf. Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 18, at 
265 (“[A]s an empirical matter, it is unclear whether the reduction in value of the old debt is sufficient 
to counteract the buoying up effect.”
99.  Choi et al., supra note 98, at 140-41.
100.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 41.
101.  Id.
102.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 265.
103.  Id.
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2003, having CACs in bonds issued under New York law has become a 
norm.104 A voting threshold of 75 percent is recommended in the CACs.105
The debtor countries can further strengthen CACs by introducing 
aggregation clauses, which bind not only bondholders within the same 
issue but all bondholders across other bond issuances and even syndicated 
bank loans. 106  An aggregation clause is powerful because it makes it 
harder for dissenting creditors to veto amendments.107 Nonetheless, such 
an aggregation clause has not been widely used in sovereign debt 
workout. 108  Recently, the IMF suggested the introduction of a “single 
limb” voting procedure—that is, a procedure that “requires only a single 
vote calculated on an aggregated basis across all affected bond series”–
into the sovereign bonds but cautioned that such “single limb” procedure 
is advisable only when “it offered all affected bondholders the same 
instrument or an identical menu of instruments.” 109  Other variants of 
CACs focus on limiting the minority’s ability to enforce the bond 
agreement. 110  These limitations can also be achieved through a trust 
structure.111
The more controversial contractual device is the Pari Passu clause, 
which “is a standard clause in public or private international unsecured 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 104.  Id. at 44. See also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the 
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1320 (2002).
105.  See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 311. In determining the voting threshold in the 
CACs, the issuers must balance two countervailing concerns. First, allowing a simple majority to 
amend the bond’s financial terms might fail to offer creditors enough protection. Second, setting the 
threshold too high might fail to offer sufficient protection against holdouts since investors like vulture 
funds can easily purchase enough shares on the secondary market to obtain a blocking position. Id. at 
312-13. A typical debt contracts with CACs also include disenfranchisement clauses, which prohibits a 
country from voting based on its holding of its own debt to avoid debtor’s opportunistic behaviors. See
Choi et al., supra note 98, at 142. 
106.  IMF, supra note 86, at 18-19. This aggregation clause resembles the bankruptcy system in 
domestic law and typically allows amendment upon some level of approval in each class and some 
(lower or higher) level of approval in the aggregate, also known as a “two limb” voting structure. See
Id. at 19; Das et al., supra note 4, at 48. 
107.  Id. See also ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 317 (“An aggregated vote avoids the risk 
of a holdout obtaining a large enough position in an individual instrument to block any amendment of 
the bond’s terms.”) 
108.  Das et al., supra note 4, at 48. The problems with aggregation clauses are obvious: it is 
difficult to determine which instruments should participate in the aggregated vote. It also creates the 
risk that one class of creditors refusing the restructuring terms would block the whole restructuring 
plan. See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 320. 
109.  IMF, supra note 86, at 20-21.
110.  Das et. al, supra note 4, at 43. By requiring a qualified majority to accelerate the debts and 
initiate an action against a debtor country, the majority enforcement provisions limit the ability of a 
minority of bondholders to enforce its rights. Id.
111.  Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps on Recovery in 
Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 499 (2010). Under a trust deed or a trust 
agreement, the right to initiate litigation is effectively delegated to the trustee who has power to 
exercise the right, but only if a minimum percentage of the bondholders request it. See Das et al., 
supra note 4, at 43. 
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debt obligation,” including bonds and bank loans.112 Pari Passu literally 
means that “with equal step.” 113  There are three types of Pari Passu
clauses: 1) a clause that makes all bonds rank equally with all other 
unsecured sovereign debt; 2) a clause that makes all bonds rank equally in 
priority of payment; and 3) a clause that makes all bonds rank equally and 
will be payable on a pro rata basis. 114  Despite its purported goal of 
reducing competition among creditors, a Pari Passu clause turns out to be 
a powerful weapon for vulture funds in holdout litigation.115 The Second 
Circuit in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, for example, chose 
the third version of the clause.116 In the aftermath of this ruling, some 
sovereign debtors have already undertaken measures to modify the clauses 
in new issuances to exclude such ratable payment interpretation. 117
Overall, the international community treats the CAC as an effective 
measure to curb holdout litigation. 118  Although there are various 
limitations to the use of CACs,119 creative contractual clauses could be 
designed to further shield against holdout litigation.
b)? The Statutory Proposal – A Miscarriage  
?
In 2001, the IMF proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM), which aimed at creating a regime to “protect a 
sovereign debtor from holdout litigation.”120 The SDRM contains several 
features tailored to reducing holdout litigation. First, it would stay creditor 
enforcement when the debtor countries activate the mechanism.121 Second, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
112.  Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, supra note 81, at 121.
113.  Id.
114.  Choi et al., supra note 98, at 146.
115.   See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
116.  See NML Capital Ltd., 669 F.3d 246, 260 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Capital Ltd., No. 08 CIV. 
6978 TPG, 2012 WL 5895786, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); see also supra note 88 and 
accompanying text.
117.  IMF, supra note 86, at 14.
118. See Id; see also IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring–Recent Developments and Implications 
for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework (Apr. 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/ 
2013/042613.pdf.
119.  For further discussion about CAC’s disadvantages, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104, 
at 1344-45.
120.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 316.
121.  Hagan, supra note 49, at 365. Activation can only occur when the debtor country 
concludes that its eligible debt was unsustainable. Id. at 361. The stay would come into force after its 
approval by a supermajority (75 percent) of creditors. RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 268. Originally, the 
IMF considered allowing an automatic stay. But it eventually concluded that this would be undesirable 
because the sovereign debtors would not be required to stop payments. See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra
note 12, at 317. Another problem with an automatic stay is that no existing institution could provide 
powerful oversight for the stay. Id.at 316. Giving IMF such an overseeing role would inevitably 
expand its power in the restructuring process. Moreover, IMF’s own exposure to the sovereign’s debt 
crisis would make it an interested party. On the other hand, establishing a new institution would be 
both politically and economically difficult. Id. The Dispute Resolution Forum established under the 
proposal would arguably certify the stay to bind creditors and debtors by prohibiting challenge against 
?
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it would aggregate claims for voting purposes.122 As previously discussed, 
the aggregation idea can be accomplished in a purely contractual way.123
Third, the SDRM would create a dispute resolution forum to ensure “the 
independence, competence, diversity, and impartiality” of the restructuring 
process.124 The legal effect of the forum’s actions is truly the “lynchpin of 
the SDRM proposal.” 125  In theory, the forum would eliminate the 
possibility of holdout litigation because the creditors would have no other 
forums available to litigate. The implementation of the SDRM faced 
practical difficulties. 126  In particular, it would be a daunting task to 
persuade countries to sign a treaty that overrides their national laws.127 Not 
surprisingly, the international community eventually abandoned the 
SDRM proposal in favor of a collective action clauses solution in 2003.128
C.? Holdout Saga Continues: Background on the Recent 
Ukraine Bond Restructuring 
?
The Ukraine debt crisis arose out of the country’s high-profile political 
dispute. During the Orange Revolution in 2004, protestors challenged the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the stay in domestic courts. See Hagan, supra note 49, at 386. Yet the Forum would not stop debtors 
from making the payments they wanted to make. 
122.  Under the clause, all creditors that appeared on the restructuring list would be bound to the 
restructuring terms that were agreed upon by creditors whose holdings comprised of at least 75 percent 
of the outstanding principal of registered and verified claims. Hagan, supra note 49, at 379. To avoid 
discrimination, SDRM would require all creditors to receive the same terms or the same choice among 
terms under the restructuring agreement. Id. Moreover, secured claims, domestic claims and official 
bilateral claims would all be excluded from the aggregation vote, largely because they differ in 
seniority from general unsecured claims. Id. The debtor would also be given the option to create “such 
classes where it concluded that the provision of differential treatment could increase the likelihood of a 
successful restructuring.” Id. at 381. 
123.  See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text; see also ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 
12, at 324 (“SDRM-like proposals that do little more than create the legal authority to allow an 
aggregated supermajority vote hardly seem worth the trouble.”)
124.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 269. The Forum will be funded by the IMF. Id.
125.  Hagan, supra note 49, at 385. Due to the strong opposition against the forum’s rule-
making authority, the proposal carefully limits the forum’s role to administrative functions, such as 
registration and verification of claims. Id. at 384. Nevertheless, once a restructuring agreement reached 
between the debtor country and creditors is certified by the Forum, the certification would be binding 
in all countries that have members of the IMF and could not be challenged in domestic courts. Id. at 
385.
126.  See ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 333.
127.  See Id.
128.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 259. Notwithstanding the ambitious goals of SDRM, some critics 
argue that the SDRM concentrated on the creditors’ coordination problem and the innovations are not 
with their political and institutional cost. Instead, they argue that a true legal mechanism should deal 
with various aspects of the sovereign debt problems, including the delay in negotiation, interim 
financing, debtor’s moral hazard, overborrowing, and delayed defaults. See generally Ugo Panizza, Do
We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion 3 (Graduate Inst. 
Of Int’l Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 03, 2013), http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/Working_ 
papers/HEIDWP03-2013.pdf; see Gelpern, supra note 9.
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outcome of the presidential election won by pro-Russian politician Viktor 
Yanukovych. 129  These protests led to Yanukovych’s resignation. 130  In 
2010, Yanukovych won the presidential election. 131  Protests broke out 
again in November 2013 after President Yanukovych reversed the 
country’s effort to build trade ties with EU, seeking instead closer 
cooperation with Russia.132
On December 17, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to 
buy $15 billion of Ukraine bonds to assist President Yanukovych’s 
regime.133 The funds, however, did not prevent the fall of Yanukovych’s 
reign in February 2014. 134  Pro-Russian military force, supported by 
President Putin, then took control of the Crimean capital, and after a 
secession referendum in March, Crimea became part of the Russian 
Federation.135
 The political conflict caused a recession in Ukraine’s economy.136
In March 2015, the IMF agreed to provide a loan of $17.5 billion to 
Ukraine as part of a four-year bailout plan.137 The aid package, however, 
requires Ukraine to secure relief on its foreign debt from its creditors.138
On August 27, 2015, after months of negotiations, Ukraine and its main 
creditors agreed to restructure $18 billion of the sovereign bonds.139 The 
exchange agreement included a 20 percent write-off of the country’s 
debt.140 The agreement was further amended in September to satisfy the 
demands of other creditors.141 While more than 75 percent of creditors on 
each bond agreed to the restructuring, Russia—which held the $3 billion 
note in the $18 billion debt—refused to participate in any part of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
129.  Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS, Nov. 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-26248275 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
130.  Id. The opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner of the election. 
131.  Id.
132.  Id.
133.  Id. The deal also included a reduction of Russian gas supplies by about a third. 
134.  Id.
135.  Id.
136.  Ukraine “has lost a fifth of its entire economic output, seen its debt pile rise to 
unsustainable levels and currency collapse by more than [sixty percent] against the [U.S.] dollar. See
Mehreen Khan, Ukraine debt crisis: Russia refuses to accept terms as Kiev finally secures debt write-
off deal with creditors, THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 27, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
economics/11827542/Ukraine-debt-crisis-Russia-refuses-to-accept-terms-as-Kiev-finally-secures-
debt-write-off-deal-with-creditors.html.
137.  I.M.F. Plans $10 Billion in New Aid to Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/business/imf-approves-fast-acting-dollar17-5-billion-bailout-for-
ukraine.html.
138.  See Khan, supra note 136.
139.  Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine and Top Creditors Agree to Restructure $18 Billion in 
Foreign Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/business/international
/ukraine-debt-restructuring.html.
140.  Id.
141.  Marton Eder & Natasha Doff, Ukraine Isolates Russia With Sweeter Terms to Deter 
Holdouts, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-
24/ukraine-sweetens-debt-deal-for-holdouts-with-2019-note-offer.
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process.142 By mid-October, Russia had become the lone holdout creditor 
in the deal.143
 Russia argues its debt should be treated as that of an official 
sovereign creditor.144 Russia insists on its official status with the obvious 
purpose of blocking the bailout fund from the IMF which, under its initial 
policy, was prohibited from lending to countries that have defaulted on its 
debt obligation to sovereign creditors.145 This goal was frustrated when the 
IMF replaced the absolute prohibition with a more flexible good-faith 
obligation of the debtor. 146  The IMF later decided the Russian bonds 
should be treated as official debt. 147  On December 20, 2015, Ukraine 
defaulted on the Russian bonds.148 While the two countries continue to 
engage in an out-of-court settlement negotiation,149 Russia has formally 
initiated a legal proceeding against Ukraine over the nonpayment in 
London’s High Court in February 2016.150  The Court heard the case in 
January 2017; in March 2017, the Court issued a ruling rejecting 
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142.  Natalia Zinets, UPDATE 3-Russia is lone holdout from Ukraine debt swap deal, REUTERS,
Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-debt-idUSL8N12F1IF20151015. 
143.  Id.     
144.  Natasha Doff, This Is What's at Stake for Putin, Ukraine as Bond Default Looms,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 7, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-07/this-is-what-s-at-
stake-for-putin-ukraine-as-bond-default-looms.
145.  Id.
146.  Andrew Mayeda & Natasha Doff, IMF Policy Change Pushes Ukraine, Russia to Resolve 
Bond Dispute, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 10, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-
10/imf-policy-change-pushes-ukraine-russia-to-resolve-bond-dispute. Under the new policy, IMF will 
allow lending to countries that default on debts to sovereign creditors, provided that the debtor country 
makes “good faith” efforts to restructure the debt. Id. The total amount of bailout fund is $17.5 billion, 
of which $7.62 billion has been disbursed as of September 2016. See Emma Rumney, Ukraine secures 
release of long-delayed €1bn IMF funding tranche, PUB. FIN. INT’L, Sept. 15, 2016, 
http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2016/09/ukraine-secures-release-long-delayed-eu1bn-
imf-funding-tranche.
147.  Marton Eder & Andrew Mayeda, Ukraine, Russia Harden Bond Stance as IMF Rules Debt 
Official, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 16, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-17/imf-says-
ukraine-bond-owned-by-russia-is-official-sovereign-debt.
148.  Natasha Doff & Marton Eder, After Default to Putin, What's Next for Ukraine-Russia Bond 
Row, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 20, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-20/after-default-
to-putin-what-s-next-for-ukraine-russia-bond-row.
149.  Natasha Doff, Ukraine Ready for Court Fight With Russia Over $3 Billion Bond,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 4, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-04/ukraine-ready-for-
court-fight-with-russia-over-3-billion-bond (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). Both countries said they remain 
open to out-of-court talks after the mediation conducted by Germany immediately after the default 
yielded no agreement. Id.
150.   Anna Andrlanova & Natasha Doff, Russia Sues Ukraine in London Court Over $3 Billion 
Default, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 17, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-17/russia-
files-suit-against-ukraine-in-london-over-3-billion-debt. The Russian bonds were drafted under 
English law and any claims must be submitted to a court in London. See Doff & Eder, supra note 148.
Washington University Open Scholarship
    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW        [VOL. 16:535?552?
Ukraine’s argument for a full trial due to Ukraine’s lack of “justiciable 
defence” in a “claim for repayment of debt instruments.”151
II.? THE UKRAINE BOND DISPUTE POSES A NEW QUESTION:
HOW SHOULD WE TREAT AN “OFFICIAL” HOLDOUT
BONDHOLDER?
Sovereign bonds held by another sovereign state are highly unusual 
because the debt is private in form (bond) and official in substance (state-
to-state lending).152 Anna Gelpern, a renowned legal scholar in sovereign 
debt restructuring, praised Russia for their “beautiful position where they 
have the choice of being an official or a private creditor.”153 But to what 
extent would this hybrid status help a holdout bondholder such as Russia?      
A.? The “Official” Status of the Bondholder Does Not Justify  
Special Treatment 
?
The “official” status of the bonds introduces a narrow legal question: 
Are official creditors holding sovereign bonds of another state 
nevertheless subject to the binding agreement between majority 
bondholders and the sovereign borrower? The question should be 
answered in the affirmative, because giving special treatment to “official” 
bondholders is at odds with the bond’s anonymous nature, violates CACs 
and Pari Passu clauses, and results in collusion between vulture funds and 
official bondholders.
First, recognizing “official bondholders” as a distinctive category is 
inconsistent with the nature of a bond as an anonymous and atomized debt 
instrument. Creditors purchase bonds with no knowledge of the identity of 
their fellow bondholders.154 Because bonds are anonymous, people expect 
bondholders to leave and enter the market constantly.155 Accordingly, it 
will be contradictory to elevate a portion of bonds governed by the same 
debt instrument because of the identity of the bondholders.
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151. UK High Court rejects full trial in Ukraine-Russia bond spat, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/eee0b5c4-4f6c-3fd8-9fda-ad69b2852b39. (During the January 
hearings, Ukraine argued that the debt was voidable because of “duress” as a result of Russia’s 
political and military threats to Ukraine; Ukraine thus demanded a full trial for this case. The London’s 
High Court rejected this argument on the ground that the defense was a matter of international law or 
treaties and thus was not justiciable. 
152.  Sujata Rao & Chris Spink, London or Paris: Which is the Club for Russia’s Ukraine 
Debt?, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-russia-bonds-idUSL6N0W-
R4J620150327 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016). Bonds are essentially a private debt vehicle. See infra notes 
154-55 and accompanying text.
153.  Rao & Spink, supra note 152.
154.  Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104, at 1320.
155.  Id.  at 155.  
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To be sure, there are reasons to treat “official” bondholders as 
categorically different from other bondholders. Bilateral borrowing 
between sovereigns is often motivated by non-commercial reasons. For 
example, a country may simply lend to another country for the primary 
purpose of providing financial aid.156 Accordingly, bilateral creditors are 
less concerned about immediate economic return than preservation of the 
facial value of the debt. Stated differently, these creditors will not easily 
accept a write-off.157 Such a distinction in creditors’ motivations, however, 
does not justify a disparate treatment. If official creditors prefer to 
maintain the facial value of the debt, they could easily choose other debt 
vehicles such as direct intergovernmental loans. When they do elect to 
benefit from the liquidity of sovereign bonds, they must also, like all other 
private bondholders, accept the precondition of such benefit—the bonds’ 
indifference to the identity of the holder.
Second, singling out official bondholders from the restructuring plan 
violates the mandates in the CACs.158 There is no language in the CAC 
that differentiates official bondholders from private bondholders.159 Thus, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
156.  ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 257.
157.  Id. at 263.
158.  The current regime for bond restructuring, as discussed above, is mostly contractually 
based. See supra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
159.  A typical CAC clause in English bond writes, in part:  
The Agency Agreement contains provisions for convening meetings of 
Noteholders to consider matters relating to the Notes, including the modification 
of any provision of these Conditions or the Deed of Covenant. Any such 
modification may be made if sanctioned by an Extraordinary Resolution (as 
defined below). 
The quorum at any such meeting for passing an Extraordinary Resolution shall 
be two or more persons holding or representing a clear majority of the principal 
amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding, or at any adjourned meeting 
two or more persons being or representing Noteholders whatever the principal 
amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding so held or represented, 
except that at any meeting the business of which includes consideration of 
proposals, inter alia, (i) to modify the maturity of the Notes or the dates on 
which interest is payable in respect of the Notes, (ii) to reduce or cancel the 
principal amount of, or interest on, the Notes, (iii) to change the currency of 
payment of the Notes, or (iv) to modify the provisions concerning the quorum 
required at any meeting of Noteholders or the majority required to pass an 
Extraordinary Resolution, the necessary quorum for passing an Extraordinary 
Resolution shall be two or more persons holding or representing not less than 75 
per cent., or at any adjourned such meeting not less than 25 per cent., of the 
principal amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding.
As used in this Condition 12, “Extraordinary Resolution” means a resolution 
passed at a meeting of the Noteholders duly convened and held in accordance 
with the provisions contained in these Conditions and the Agency Agreement by 
a majority consisting of not less than 75 per cent. of the persons voting thereat 
upon a show of hands or if a poll shall be duly demanded then by a majority 
consisting of not less than 75 per cent. of the votes given on the poll. An 
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under the four-corner rule of contractual interpretation, 160 the clause 
mandates that any restructuring plan passed by a majority of the 
bondholders would be binding on all bondholders. The IMF treatment of 
the debt as an official claim is irrelevant to the interpretation of the CAC; 
the Russia claim is regarded official only “for the purposes of the Fund’s 
policy on arrears to official bilateral creditors.”161 It does not alter the 
binding force of the restructured plan. Indeed, given that CACs have 
demonstrated their power to ward off vulture funds in the Ukraine’s bond 
restructuring process, 162 to exclude Russia might severely encroach on the 
legitimacy of the clauses.  
Third, the disparate treatment between official and private 
bondholders also contradicts the principle embodied in the Pari Passu
clause. Notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s expansive reading of the 
clause in the Argentina case,163 the clause means all bondholders will have 
the same priority among themselves and the debtor’s other unsecured 
creditors. 164  If the debtor is obligated to negotiate with official 
bondholders with better terms, it formally subordinates the private 
bondholders to the official holdout creditors.165 This would run afoul of 
the Pari Passu clause.
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Extraordinary Resolution passed at any meeting of Noteholders will be binding 
on all Noteholders, whether or not they are present at the meeting.
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 104, Appendix A (emphasis added). 
160.  If possible, a contract should be interpreted as to “give effect to its general purpose as 
revealed within its four corners or in its entirety.” 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:5 (4th ed.). 
161.  Press Release, Executive Board, IMF Executive Board Takes Decision on the Status of 
Ukraine's Eurobond Held by the Russian Federation, IMF Press Release No. 15/570 (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15570.htm.
162. The old Ukraine bonds contained per series CACs. In each series, if 75% in value voted in 
favor of the agreement, all holders would be bound by it. See Ukraine’s Sovereign Restructuring: Why 
is this sovereign deal ground-breaking?, WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, http://www.weil.com/ 
~/media/files/pdfs/2015/ukraine-sovereign-restructuring.pdf (Last visited Feb. 6, 2016). These CACs 
in the Ukraine bonds proved to be effective to deter holdout litigation. With the major bondholders at 
the negotiation table, vulture funds would find it difficult to stop the exchange agreement by obtaining 
a large block. See Natasha Doff, Ukraine Shielded From Vultures by Templeton Has One Less 
Problem, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/ukraine-
shielded-from-vultures-by-templeton-has-one-less-problem (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  The new 
Ukraine bonds go one step further; they include CACs that adopt an aggregate voting feature. See
Weil, supra (The CACs in the new notes “allow[] a super-majority across all series of New Notes to 
agree changes to bond terms that are then binding on all holders . . . [and] allow[] Ukraine to 
effectively treat all New Notes as a single group, removing the threat posed by holdouts.”)
163.  See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
164.  See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 81, at 123. It is likely that the English courts will adhere 
to this basic “equal rank” interpretation despite the fact that U.S. courts have adopted a more 
expansive view in the Argentina sovereign debt litigation. IMF, supra note 86, at 13.
165.  An agreement between participating bondholders and a sovereign debtor can be 
discriminatory. Buchheit noted that “you can do pretty much whatever you want in discriminating 
among creditors (in terms of who gets paid and who does not) but do not try to justify your behavior 
by taking steps that purport to establish a legal basis for discrimination.” Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, 
supra note 81, at 125. IMF’s requirement that Ukraine engage in good faith negotiations with Russia is 
a condition for the IMF’s bailout package. See Mayeda & Doff, supra note 147. One can say that this 
good faith obligation legally elevates Russia’s status as a bondholder.
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Finally, the exclusion of official bondholders from the restructuring 
process may induce collusion between official bondholders and vulture 
funds. If an official bondholder were immune from the restructuring plan, 
sovereign debtors must exclude official bondholders from contractual 
clauses ex ante in order to prevent endless renegotiation.166 The official 
bondholders, because of their immunity from the restructuring process, 
could continue to hold the bonds and seek full repayment of the debt; 
alternatively, they may choose to liquidate their interests in the secondary 
markets, attracting buyers such as vulture funds that are aggressively 
purchasing bonds in order to augment enough shares to block a 
restructuring plan.  Such collusion, therefore, would cause CACs to be less 
effective in deterring holdout creditors.167 Even the possibility of selling 
bonds to vulture funds would be detrimental to the restructuring process. 
For example, the official bondholders may threaten to sell their bonds to 
vulture funds, thus forcing the sovereign debtor to grant more favorable 
terms to official bondholders at the expense of other private bondholders’ 
interests.168
B.? If “Official” Bondholders are  Given Special Treatment, 
Arbitration Would be the Most Suitable Resolution Mechanism 
Assuming “official” bondholders will be treated differently, the Paris 
Club seems to be the proper venue for this dispute because of the bond’s 
status.169 The Paris Club’s policies, however, may pose some obstacles. 
One potential problem arises out of the comparable treatment principle. 
This principle requires private creditors to match with official bilateral 
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166.  For example, the new restructured Ukraine bonds include a most favored creditor clause 
that prohibits Ukraine from settling holdouts (including Russia) on more favorable terms than the new 
notes. See Weil, supra note 162 (The new bond agreement contains “Ukraine is prohibited from 
settling with holdouts (including Russia) on more favourable terms than the New Notes. If this clause 
is breached, it will trigger an Event of Default under the New Notes. Therefore, if Ukraine grants more 
favorable terms to Russia, such an agreement will inevitably trigger a default under the new notes and 
call for renegotiation with the private bondholders. Id.
167. CACs deter holdout by making it more difficult for holdout creditors to purchase blocking 
shares. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
168. One solution to such collusion might be to limit the liquidity of the sovereign bonds held by 
the official bondholders through bilateral treaties.
169.  Public debts that fall within the realm of the Paris Club are defined as “credits and loans 
granted by Paris Club creditors' governments or relevant institutions, as well as commercial credits 
guaranteed by them.” See Club de Paris, Definition of Debt Treated, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ 
communications/page/definition-of-debt-treated (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). The Eurobond held by 
Russia squarely fits into this definition because the bonds were “acquired by Russia’s [National 
Wealth Fund]” acting on behalf of the Russian government “pursuant to [its] decision . . . to provide 
assistance to Ukraine......” IMF Press Release, supra note 164.
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lenders.170 While in most cases the assessment is complicated, the bonds 
held by official creditors and those by private creditors are inherently of 
the same type and should be offered identical restructured terms.    
This dilemma calls for a revisit of the meaning of “comparability.” 
Giving creditors different treatment is not always “discriminatory”; rather, 
different treatment can simply reflect different preferences of the 
creditors.”171 Official bondholders can negotiate terms with no face value 
debt reduction with a lower yield rate that are still comparable to 
restructured bonds held by private creditors with a write-down and high 
yield.172 This is consistent with the general policy of the Paris Club to 
grant debt reduction to sovereigns other than heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs).173  Thus, the fact that the private and official creditors 
hold the same debt instrument does not necessarily mean they must be 
given equal terms.174
Another technical problem is the distinction between flow treatment 
and stock treatments. The Paris Club primarily gives “[f]low treatment” to 
debtor countries to close its financing gap identified by the IMF.175 The 
result is that only the payments coming due during the IMF program are 
treated. 176  Bond restructuring, instead, qualifies as “stock treatments,” 
meaning that the treatments apply to the entire stock. 177  Since stock 
treatments are not granted “unless the country demonstrates a satisfactory 
track record with both the Paris Club and the IMF,”178 the debtor has to 
wait for a few years before they can restructure the bond. In addition to the 
Paris Club, the official bondholder may also try to enforce the bond 
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170.  Club de Paris, supra note 38. The Paris Club will usually look at a variety of factors to 
assess comparability, including “type of creditor,” “changes in nominal debt services,” etc. Id.
171. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 258.
172.  Id.
173.  RIEFFEL, supra note 1, at 84.
174.  While the Paris Club might be a possible forum for future official holdout dispute, it is no 
longer an option for Ukraine and Russia. Neither of the two countries has sought help from the Paris 
Club. Olga Tanas & Ksenia Galouchko, Russia Says Won’t Modify Ukraine Bond It Deems Official 
Aid, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 27, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-27/russia-says-
won-t-restructure-ukraine-bond-it-deems-official-aid. One problem is that Ukraine is now stuck with 
the bond exchange agreement with its private creditors who have agreed a 20 percent write-off. See
supra note 139 and accompanying text. Resorting to the Paris Club might be anachronistic, because 
the Paris Club process is conditioned upon its restructuring process preceding the restructuring of any 
other debts the debtor may have with private creditors. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 12, at 261. 
Moreover, because the exchange agreement contains the most favored creditor clause, starting a Paris 
Club process triggers an automatic default on the new bonds and initiates a new round of debt 
renegotiation with private creditors. 
175.  Club de Paris, Flow and Stock Treatments, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communicat- 
ions/page/flow-and-stock-treatments (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
176.  Id.
177.  Id. Unlike the flow treatment, the purpose of covering the stock of debt “is to provide a 
country with a final Paris Club treatment called an exit treatment.” Id.
178.  Id. (“[S]tock treatments may be granted, on a case-by-case basis, for countries that have a 
satisfactory track record with both the Paris Club and the IMF and where there is sufficient confidence 
in the debtor country's ability to meet its obligations under the debt agreement.”)  
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agreement in court. However, litigation is unlikely to bring about a 
satisfactory outcome. Undoubtedly, the official bondholder may benefit 
from the expansive reading of Pari Passu clause in the Argentina ruling.179
Yet the plain meaning of  the CACs (i.e. a majority or super-majority rule) 
may significantly weaken its position.180 A more important reason to avoid 
litigation is the political impact of the dispute. Bilateral debt arrangements 
invariably involve political exchange.181 Accordingly, the debtor country 
may seek to invalidate the entire debt for political reasons. For example, in 
the Russia-Ukraine sovereign bond dispute, Ukraine may invoke the 
odious debt doctrine, arguing that the debt was “odious” and should be 
void as against international public policy.182 Like WDF in World Duty 
Free v. Kenya, Ukraine may bring evidence about any bribery or 
corruptive conducts on the part of the former President Yanukovych.183
Such exposure unnecessarily disrupts the bilateral relationship the 
countries may attempt to maintain. It may also create a negative 
impression on the integrity of the Russian government.   
Compared to the Paris Club process and litigation, arbitration may be 
particularly suitable for this type of dispute. Arbitration enjoys several 
advantages over litigation, including its neutrality, flexibility, and 
efficiency.184 The rule of confidentiality prevents unnecessary exposure of 
politically sensitive information. 185  Unlike treaty-based claims such as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
179.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. But see Lachlan Burn, Pari passu clauses: 
English law after NML v Argentina, 9 CAP. MARKET L J. 2, 9 (2014) (“There is almost no risk that 
English courts, faced with similar facts to NML v Argentina, would adopt the ‘payment’ 
interpretation.”)
180.  See supra notes 104-09, 158-60 and the accompanying text.
181.  For example, the then opposition leader of Ukraine in 2013 suspected that “Yanukovych 
had handed over Ukrainian firms and strategic assets in return for Russian help.” Yanukovych himself 
admitted his decision had been influenced by heavy pressure from Russia. Russia offers Ukraine major 
economic assistance, BBC, Dec. 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118.  
182.  See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
183.  Ukraine has publicly adopted this position. “This $3 billion was in reality a bribe from 
Russia so that President Viktor Yanukovych would stop the association agreement with the EU," 
announced by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. See Natasha Doff, Putin Tests English Debt Law as 
Ukraine Feud Heads to London, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-10-28/putin-tests-english-debt-law-as-ukraine-feud-heads-to-london. Evidence shows 
that the bond contains “a clause designed to prevent Ukraine from offsetting its debt due to damages 
inflicted by Russia, such as the annexation of Crimea, which President Petro Poroshenko plans to seek 
compensation for.” Id. This might create the impression that Russia granted the bond as a “bribe” to 
President Yanukovych in exchange for the latter’s cooperation on the Crimea issue. Id. During the 
January 2017 hearing in front the London’s High Court, Ukraine did take a similar position, claiming 
that the debt was “voidable” due to political pressure from Russia. See supra note 151 (Ukraine argued 
the bonds were “in reality a tool of oppression wielded by one sovereign state against another.”) 
184.  Cross, supra note 89, at 354.
185.  Many arbitral institutions have formal confidentiality rules, such as the London Court of 
International Arbitration. Id. Article 30 provides: 
30.1  The parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential all
awards in the arbitration, together with all materials in the arbitration created 
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those in the Abaclat arbitration, official bondholders’ claims do not derive 
from bilateral treaties and are subject to no mandatory disclosure rule.186
Also, because official bondholders are highly unusual, 187  the public 
interest in establishing a legal principle governing official holdout is very 
limited. Finally, while formal judgment in sovereign litigation may 
encounter enforcement problems,188 foreign arbitral awards are more likely 
to be enforced than foreign judgments.189
III.? CONCLUSION
?
 For years, holdout litigations launched by ruthless vulture funds 
halted sovereign bond restructuring. The concern triggered the adoption of 
various contractual devices, especially the Collective Action Clause in the 
bond agreement, which have demonstrated the power to ward off private 
holdouts. The Ukraine bond dispute, however, introduced a new type of 
holdout monster that claims an “official” status and an absolute immunity 
from the contractual arrangement. Despite the official status of the 
sovereign bondholders, no immunity or privilege should be granted to an 
official holdout bondholder because concluding otherwise contradicts the 
private nature of the bonds and disrupts the entire contractual regime the 
international community has built. Furthermore, if special treatment is 
inevitable, the dispute between debtor and official bondholder should be 
dealt with in arbitration because the technicalities within the Paris Club 
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for the purpose of the arbitration and all other documents produced by another 
party in the proceedings not otherwise in the public domain, save and to the 
extent that disclosure may be required of a party by legal duty, to protect or 
pursue a legal right, or to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceedings 
before a state court or other legal authority. . . . 
30.3   The LCIA does not publish any award or any part of an award without the 
prior written consent of all parties and the Arbitral Tribunal. 
See London Court of International Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 30 (2014),
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx#Article 30 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016) (emphasis added).
186.  The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were formally amended in 2013 to require certain 
documents used in arbitrations to be released to the public. For example, Article 3 states, in part: 
[T]he following documents shall be made available to the public: the notice of 
arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the 
statement of defence and any further written statements or written submissions 
by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents and 
to expert reports and witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the 
proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written submissions by the 
non-disputing Party (or Parties) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of 
hearings, where available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral 
tribunal.
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency for Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, art. 3 (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf.
187.  See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
188.  See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
189.  Cross, supra note 89, at 356-364.
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and the potential exposure of political scandals in courts render both 
forums unappealing.   
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